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‘Thinking the Creator and Creature Together’:
How Rāmānuja’s Account of Scriptural Meaning
Encourages Unitive Language in Christian Discourse
about God and the World
Martin Ganeri OP
Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford
ABSTRACT: The interest shown by Christian
theologians in the work of Rāmānuja has
tended to focus on his doctrinal account of God
and his embodiment cosmology. This paper
explores instead Rāmānuja’s account of
language in general and then those Vedāntic
texts that grammatically identify the world
with the ultimate reality, Brahman. It shows
how Rāmānuja is able to affirm the primary
meaning of these texts, but in such a way as to
express the complete contingency of the world
on the ultimate reality as well as their
distinction. The paper goes on to develop a
theological dialogue between Rāmānuja and
the Christian Scholastic theology of Thomas
Aquinas. Whereas Christian theology has
tended generally to avoid language that
identifies the world with God as being
pantheistic and opposed to the doctrine of
creation, an appropriation of Rāmānuja’s
account of language encourages the use of such
unitive language as a powerful way of
expressing the unique relation that is creation.

Introduction
At the heart of Rāmānuja’s theology is his
exegesis of the Vedāntic scriptural texts. In
support of his exegesis Rāmānuja advances a
number of arguments about how language
works both in general and in the theological
context. And he puts forward a distinctive
account of the semantic relation between
language and the reality of entities in the
world, including the nature of their
relationship with the ultimate reality,
Brahman. A central application of this is in his
account of those scriptural texts that
grammatically identify the world with
Brahman. For Rāmānuja such statements can
be taken at their primary meaning without
denying that the world is distinct from
Brahman and that it exists as a reality wholly
dependent on Brahman, as the body of
Brahman. It is his account of language that
enables him to resolve the apparent
contradiction that this involves. For such
identity statements, taken straightforwardly,
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imply that Brahman and the world form a
substantial unity, i.e. that they have a
metaphysical identity.
Yet, Rāmānuja’s
cosmological account denies such a substantial
unity.1
Christian theological engagement with
Rāmānuja has tended to give more attention to
his cosmology as a resource for the creative
enrichment of Christian theology. 2 However,
his account of language is also very interesting
and in this article I would like to argue that
Christian theology might also embrace and
appropriate his account of identity statements
as a resource for expressing the unique
relationship that is creation. 3 Christian
theology has generally shunned such identity
statements on the basis that they do imply a
pantheistic relationship, a substantial unity,
one that is alien to Christian understanding of
the relationship between God and the world.
Engagement with Rāmānuja’s account of
language, however, encourages a creative
rethinking of Christian accounts of language
when it comes to this relationship.
Rāmānuja: language and reality
The presence of sentences in which the
world is grammatically identified with
Brahman is a striking feature of the Vedāntic
scriptures and the question of how to interpret
them becomes a major topic in the Vedāntic
schools. Of particular concern are those that
identify the finite self with Brahman, such as ‘I
am
Brahman’
(ahaṃ
brahmāsmi,
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10) or ‘That you
are, Śvetaketu’ (tat tvam asi śvetaketu,
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8.7ff). For the Advaitic
school these are taken as affirming a strict
identity between the finite self and Brahman
and this then forms the central doctrine within
Advaita as a whole. For those Vedāntic schools,
such as Rāmānuja’s, that affirm that the world
and the finite selves within human beings are
distinct from Brahman there is inevitably the
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question of what meaning to give them, when
their primary seem to contradict the
distinction being otherwise maintained.
Rāmānuja’s general account of language
emerges in contexts where he is discussing
these texts and serves to give a basis for being
able to justify his exegesis of them.
Rāmānuja’s first develops a general
account of how to understand sentences where
words of the same case are co-ordinated with
each other, such as ‘The cloth is red,’ or
‘Devadatta is dark-complexioned, young,
reddish-eyed, not poor, not stupid, of
irreproachable character.’
(Rāmānuja Śrī
4
Bhāṣya (Ś.Bh.) 1.1.13). For Rāmānuja it is
commonly agreed that what characterises such
sentences is that there is the ‘predication to one
entity of several words having different
reasons for their application.’ (Ś.Bh1.1.13). 5
There is a single grammatical subject about
which a number of predicates are made and
these predicates inform us in different ways
about the nature of that subject. And in terms
of their relation to reality, they refer to single
entities in the world and tell us about what kind
of entities they are and what they are otherwise
like.
Supporting this account is Rāmānuja’s
argument that there is a structural
correspondence between language and reality,
taking the inflected language of Sanskrit as his
model. In other words, the differentiation
present within Sanskrit words constructed of
verbal roots and their affixes, as well as that
present in sentences composed of a number of
words, reflects real differences in entities
themselves. As he puts it:
Language, in particular, is capable only of
denoting an entity having distinct
attributes, because it takes the form of
words and sentences. For a word is the
union of a root and an affix. Because of the
difference in the meaning of the root and
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affix, it cannot but make known a complex
object. And the differentiation within a
word is linked to differentiation in the
object (Ś.Bh. 1.1.1).6
A second aspect of Rāmānuja’s account of
language is that he asserts that the reality of
how entities are determines the meaning of
language for us. In the case of the redness of a
cloth we know that the redness only exists by
virtue of the cloth. The redness inheres in the
cloth. This Rāmānuja calls the relationship of a
mode (prakāra). For Rāmānuja this means that
part of the primary meaning of the word ‘red’
is the cloth, in that part of our understanding
of what ‘red’ means is that it refers to the cloth
in which it inheres. Thus, for Rāmānuja, a
sentence like ‘the cloth is red’ has a double
primary meaning; first, its primary meaning is
that the cloth is characterised by the colour red
and is one entity; second, the meaning is that
‘red’ is a mode of the cloth, referring us to the
cloth.
Rāmānuja extends this account to include
the relationship between a body and its self and
to sentences that talk of bodies and their selves.
The relation of a body to its self is a modal
relationship, like that of an attribute and the
entity in which it inheres, since the body also
only exists as dependent on the self. So, any
word for a body also refers us to the self within
it. This is also part of the primary meaning of
the word. Summing up both his account of the
meaning of words denoting modes and how it
relates to the relationship of bodies to the
selves of which they are the bodies, Rāmānuja
states:
Because a body is the mode of the self that
possesses the body, and because words
naming a mode terminate in the mode
possessor, words naming a body rightly
terminate in the self that possesses the
body. For a mode is the part perceived as
‘thus’ in some entity perceived as ‘this is
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such.’ A word that makes the mode known
has its terminus of meaning in the mode
possessor, rightly doing so because the
understanding of a mode depends on the
mode possessor, since the mode depends
for its existence on the mode possessor
(Ś.Bh. 1.1.13)7
Rāmānuja uses this account of language to
support his exegesis of those Vedāntic
scriptural texts that co-ordinate the world and
Brahman, in particular the statement, ‘That
you are, Śvetaketu.’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad
6.8.7ff). For Rāmānuja the Vedānta texts make
known to us that the world, or more precisely
each entity within the world, is the body of
Brahman, who is its inner self. This is
something that is revealed to us, rather than
something obvious to us from observation of
the world. But once we do know this, then what
the language we use for entities in the world
means for us changes. Words for entities in the
world now also refer us to Brahman as the self
on which they depend for their existence, since
we now know that they are modes of Brahman
(Ś.Bh. 1.1.13 M. 57-60):
Persons untutored in the Vedānta do not
see that Brahman is the self of all
individuals and types of beings, and they
think that the terminus expressed by all
[substance] words is only the various types
of being [overtly expressed by these
words]. But these are in fact only a part of
what is expressed. Once they study the
Vedānta statements they know that
everything is ensouled by Brahman and
that all words express Brahman as
conditioned by various modes, in that
everything is Brahman’s effect and he is
their inner controller (Rāmānuja, Vedārtha
Saṃgraha para. 21).8
The text, ‘That you are, Śvetaketu,’ cannot
be taken to mean that the world itself is strictly
identical with Brahman, since we know from
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revelation that each entity in the world is the
body of Brahman, distinct from Brahman,
having its own substantial existence, but
completely dependent on Brahman for its
existence. But, at the same time, the text can
still be taken at its primary meaning, because,
in the light of revelation, we now see the
primary meaning of words for entities in the
world refers us to Brahman. Thus, in the
sentence, ‘That you are, Śvetaketu, the word
‘you,’ as well as the word, ‘That,’ refer us to
Brahman. The grammatical identity within the
sentence can be upheld, since both words refer
to Brahman. Hence, such statements express in
a particularly emphatic way the relationship
the world has with Brahman:
In the case of the co-ordinative text, ‘That
you are,’ the word ‘that’ makes know the
supreme Self who is the maker of the world,
who is characterised by all auspicious
qualities, whose will is always realised and
from whom any suggestion of any taint is
rejected and the word, ‘you’ makes known
the supreme Self who has as his body the
embodied finite self (Ś.Bh. 1.1.13).9
Christian Discourse about God and the World
Turning now to Christian theological
engagement with Rāmānuja, I would like first to
mention a comment made by the
contemporary Christian theologian David
Burrell C.S.C. Burrell became familiar with
another form of Christian encounter with
Vedānta, in the form of the work of twentieth
century Catholic Thomist theologians, who
brought the Scholastic thought of Thomas
Aquinas into a sustained encounter with
classical Advaita Vedānta. Two of these
theologians, Richard de Smet S.J. and Sara
Grant R.S.C.J. argued for a convergence
between the account given of the Brahman and
Brahman’s relationship with finite reality
found in Advaita Vedānta and the account of
God and of God’s relationship with the world
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found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, based on
a realist reading of some works of Śaṃkara. In
the light of becoming familiar with their work
in the form of a set of lectures given by Sarah
Grant,10 Burrell has commented in a number of
his writings that Vedāntic non-dualistic
language might help us, as he puts it, ‘think
creator and creature together.’11
Burrell does so in the context of his own
detailed examination of Christian Scholastic
theology’s use of Islamic thought as Christian
Scholastics sought to find an adequate way of
expressing the creational relation between God
and the world. Both Islamic and Christian
thinkers were faced by the inadequacy of the
ordinary causal language describing types
causation within the world for expressing the
unique case of causation that is creation.
Creation is the doctrine that the world is
produced by God in such as way that the world
is distinct from God, but dependent for the
entirety of its existence on God at all times. The
world is distinct from God, but does not exist
separate from God. The world has a substantial
existence of its own, but is totally dependent
for this existence on God. On the one hand, the
ordinary causal language of a human craftsman
making other things can be used to express the
production of the world by God, but suggests
that world is separate from God, since the
things made by craftsmen are separate from
their maker. On the other hand, the causal
language of natural generation or emanation of
one entity from another thing does expresses
the total dependence of the world on God at all
times, but suggests that God and the world are
one substance in a pantheistic fashion.
Christian scholastic theologians such as
Thomas Aquinas sought to combine both types
of causal language, interpreting them in such a
way that the disadvantages of both were
minimized (e.g. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
(S.T.) 1.44-45). For his part, Burrell suggests
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that we might find in Vedāntic language a
further resource for expressing the creational
relationship that helps us express this unique
relation, one that complements existing
solutions. Following his lead, I want to explore
how Rāmānuja’s own account of language and
of Vedāntic identity statements can itself serve
as a kind of catalyst for using identity language
in a Christian context, without any fear that we
will end up with a pantheistic account.
Following the lead of those earlier Christian
theologians who engaged with Advaita Vedānta
I will also take Thomas Aquinas as the point of
encounter on the Christian side and ask of his
theology whether it can accommodate and be
enriched by an engagement with Rāmānuja.
Since the encounter with Advaita Vedānta was
itself based on a realist reading of Advaita
Vedānta, this can fittingly be extended to an
encounter with the realist form of Vedānta
found in Rāmānuja.
Aquinas: language and reality
For his account of language in general
Aquinas draws on Aristotle and on Aristotle’s
semantic triangle of entities, words and
concepts. Here words are said to refer to
entities via the concepts of those entities
formed in human minds. When we use a
sentence like ‘Socrates is a human being and is
wise,’ we have a concept in our minds about
what a human being is and what wisdom is. The
concept is the definition or ratio of what a
human being and what wisdom are:
According to the Philosopher (Peri Herm.
Lib. 1, l.1, n.2) words are signs of ideas and
ideas the likenesses of entities. And so it is
evident that words signify entities through
the medium of the concept the intellect has
[of the entity]. It follows therefore that we
can give a name to any entity insofar as we
can understand it (S.T. 1.13.1).12
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The ratio that a name signifies is the
concept of the intellect about the things
signified by the name (S.T. 1.13.4).13
So, for Aquinas, language relates to the
reality of the world through the medium of
human thought. This means that words and
sentences are dependent on human agreement
about what they mean and how they can be
used (e.g. Aquinas, In Peri Hermeneias Lib. 1, l.2,
n.5).
We noted that Rāmānuja affirms a
structural correspondence between language
and the reality of entities. Likewise, for Aquinas
there is a structural correspondence in the
relation between language and finite entities,
via the concepts formed about these entities. In
a sentence like ‘Socrates is a human being and
is wise,’ the ratio or defining concept of what
‘human being’ and ‘wise’ is a mental concept in
the human being using this language. But the
sentence, ‘Socrates is a human being and is
wise’ is said to be a true sentence only if it
corresponds to the reality of what Socrates is,
since truth, for Aquinas, is the conformity of
the mind and entities, as that is expressed in
language (S.T. 16.2). Thus, the ratio of ‘human
being’ and ‘wise’ is something that can also be
said to inhere in the entity itself in the sense
that it is the reality of what kind of entity a
human being is and what kind of quality being
wise is. The different concepts correspond to
different aspects of the reality of finite
entities.14
For Aquinas the exception to this is God,
whose existence is entirely simple, that is to
say, not characterized by the forms of
composition that characterize finite reality.
For Aquinas we can use certain words that
denote perfections of existence, such as ‘wise,’
of both finite entities and of God and predicate
them literally both of finite entities and of God.
Yet in so doing we are speaking analogously,
since how these words correspond to the
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reality of finite entities and God is different. In
the case of a finite entity, such as Socrates, his
being a human being and his being wise
correspond to really different aspects of his
existence, but in God there is only the infinite
existence that is God and while to say that he is
wise does correspond to the reality of his
existence, this does not correspond to real
differences in his existence (S.T. 1.13. 2,5).
We can already see here certain
convergences between Aquinas’ account of
language and how it relates to reality and that
of Rāmānuja. For Aquinas, when we use a
sentence like, ‘Socrates is a human being and is
wise’ we name aspects of what kind of entity
Socrates is and what he is like and these are
aspects that inhere in Socrates. Moreover, the
human nature of Socrates and his being wise
only exist because they are found in the
concrete entity called Socrates. This is what
Rāmānuja calls the modal relationship. So, it
might also seem natural, after reading
Rāmānuja, to extend Aquinas’ account and also
say that when we use these words they also
refer us to the concrete entity we are talking
about. Their primary meaning for us extends
to that concrete entity on which they depend
for having existence. Moreover, in terms of
God and the world, for Aquinas we know in the
light both of revelation and human reasoning
that the world is created by God. We know that
the world has been produced by God and
depends on God for its existence at all times.
So, we could say that for Aquinas the world has
a modal relationship with God, in the wider
scope of that term given by Rāmānuja.
Now, if we put these things together, I think
we can see how Rāmānuja’s account of identity
statements between Brahman and the world
can be appropriated creatively and usefully by
a Christian theologian using Aquinas’ account
both of language and of creation. We noted
that for Aquinas words refer to entities via
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concepts and that human agreement
determines what words and sentences mean.
In the theological context in which we know
that the world is created our understanding of
the reality of the world acquires a new depth.
And we could agree that the concepts we have
about things in the world should reflect this
new depth. Hence, what the words themselves
mean for us extends to the Creator on whom all
the entities we name by these words depend. In
this deeper theological context, a word like
‘human being’ would refer immediately to the
concrete human being in which human nature
inheres, but also to the God on whom the
existence of any concrete human being
depends. In effect, this is what Rāmānuja
himself does. In the light of revelation he
expands the concept of what the primary
meaning of words for entities in the world is.
Thus, a sentence like ‘Socrates is God’ could
be made by a Christian theologian, if it is said
that the concept of what ‘Socrates’ includes the
meaning that he is created by God. The
sentence would mean that Socrates is a human
being who depends for his existence on God. It
would not mean that Socrates is the same as
God, or has a substantial unity with God. We
could think creature and creator together and
do so in way that upholds both the distinct
reality of the creature and the inseparable
relation of dependency that are both elements
of the doctrine of creation.
For Aquinas words denoting perfections of
existence, such as ‘wise,’ can be predicated
literally, if analogously, of finite entities and of
God because the ratio or defining concept of
such terms is not tied to any particular mode of
existence. They can characterise both the
finite and composite mode of existence found
in finite entities and the infinite and simple
mode of existence found in God. Yet with
words like ‘human being’ the ratio or defining
concept is tied to finite reality, to the nature of
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created things, since a ‘human being’ is
inherently a finite and composite entity. The
Bible often does predicate words that denote
finite or created reality of God, but within
Aquinas’ understanding of this, such language
is inherently metaphorical and expresses ways
in which God is similar to created entities (S.T.
1.13. ad.1). For instance, when the Bible calls
God a ‘rock’ (Psalm 18:2) or a ‘shepherd’ (Psalm
23: 1) it means that God is a secure refuge for
human beings to rely on like a rock or is the
guide, provider and protector of human beings,
like a shepherd. Yet, what underlies both
analogous and metaphorical language is the
reality that God is the cause of all the aspects of
existence found in finite entities.
Finite
entities such a human being only exist as such
because God causes them to be and they can
only be wise or good or powerful because God
causes them to be such. Thus, a creative use by
Christian theologians of identity statements to
express the inseparable relationship of
dependence between God and the finite entities
that make up the created world helps make
manifest something that is already present in
Aquinas’ wider discussion of how language is
used of God.
This creative extension of Aquinas’ account
of language accords also with ways in which
Aquinas himself interprets sentences in the
Bible where human beings are said to share in
the divine nature. In terms of creation there
are few such texts, but they are not completely
absent and have required Christian exegetes to
explain how they could be true. Thus in Psalm
82:6 it is said, ‘I said, ‘You are gods, sons of the
Most High, all of you.’ For Aquinas the meaning
of this sentence cannot be an affirmation of any
strict identity between human beings and God,
but rather that human beings have a certain
likeness to the divine nature. As he puts it:
This name, ‘God’ is nonetheless
communicable [to other entities], not
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according to its whole signification, but
according to some aspect of it through a
certain likeness, so that they are called
gods, who share in an aspect of divinity
through a likeness, according to the text, ‘I
said, You are gods.’ (Psalm 82.6) (S.T.
1.13.9).15
In other words, human beings share in
aspects of the nature of God, above all by
having intellect and will whereby they can be
said to be made in the image of God.
In keeping with this, Aquinas explains the
meaning of texts where human beings and God
are identified in the order of salvation or of
grace, sentences that have led to rich spiritual
language of ‘divinization’ within the Christian
tradition. Thus, in 2 Peter 1:4, the promise is
given that by divine power human beings can
‘become partakers of the divine nature’ (R.S.V
tanslation) or in John 17: 21, Christ prays ‘that
they be one even as thou, Father, art in me, and
I in thee, that they also may be in us’ (R.SV.) For
Aquinas these texts do not mean that human
beings enter into a substantial unity with God,
but rather that there is a certain assimilation to
the divine nature through participation in
divine grace. It is this operation of divine grace
that makes it possible to talk of the deification
of human beings:
The gift of grace exceeds every faculty of
created nature, since it is nothing other
than a certain sharing in the divine nature,
which exceeds every other nature.
For it is necessary that only God deifies by
communicating a fellowship in the divine
nature through a certain participated
likeness (S.T. 1-2.112.1).16
In the first place, this is a metaphorical way
of speaking, just as the predication of words
that express concept that have an inherently
finite or creaturely connotation of God are
metaphorical, since the divine nature as such is
inherently incompatible with finite reality.

7
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Yet, such language does denote the real
assimilation of human beings to the divine
nature, insofar as the life of human beings is
drawn into a fellowship with the divine nature.
Concluding Remarks
Thus, a further use of identity statements
to include the modal dependency advanced by
Rāmānuja can creatively extend the account
Aquinas already gives. It can provide Christian
theologians working with the Thomist or
similar theology a resource to ‘think the
creator and creature together.’ One final
comment can support such a creative
appropriation of Rāmānuja’s thought as a
natural extension of what Aquinas himself
does. Aquinas does have an account of how
Christian theology can engage with nonChristian thought. 17 For Aquinas, Christian
theology can take from non-Christian thought
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padasyaiva viśiṣṭārthapratipādanam avarjanīyam.
padabhedaśca arthabhedanibandhanaḥ.
7
Melkoṭe Vol. II, p.58: śarīrasya śarīriṇaṃ prati
prakāratvāt prakāravācināṃ ca śabdānāṃ
prakāriṇyeva paryvasanāt śarīravācināṃ śabdānāṃ
śarīriparyavasānaṃ nyāyyam. prakāro hi nāma
‘idam ityam’ iti pratīyamāne vastuni ‘ittham’ iti
pratīyamānaḥ aṃśaḥ. tasya tadvastvapekṣatvena
tatpratīteḥ
tadapekṣatvāt,
tasminneva
paryavasānaṃ yuktamiti, tasya pratipādako pi
śabda tasminneva paryavasyati
8
Quoted from Lipner, J.J. (1986) The Face of
Truth. p.42. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1349-07915-5
9
Melkoṭe Vol. II, p.60: ‘tattvamasi’ iti

sāmānādhikaraṇye, ‘tat’ padaṃ jagatkaraṇabhūtaṃ
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satyasaṃkalpaṃ
sarvakalyāṇaguṇākaraṃ
nirastasamastaheyagandhaṃ
paramātmānaṃ
ācaṣṭe; ‘tvam’ iti ca tameva saśarīrajīvaśarīrakam
ācaṣṭe
The Teape lectures, which Sara Grant gave in
Cambridge in 1989, were subsequently published as
Grant, S. R.S.C.J. (2002). Toward an Alternative
10

Theology: Confessions of a Non-Dual Christian.

Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame,
with an introduction by Bradley J. Malkovsky
11
Burrell, D. (2003) ‘Aquinas’s Appropriation of
Liber de causis to Articulate the Creator as Cause-of
being in F. Kerr (ed) Contemplating Aquinas; On the
Varieties of Interpretation . London: SCM; (2004)
‘Thomas Aquinas and Islam,’ Modern Theology
20:71-89.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14680025.2004.00243.x
12
All Latin texts are taken from: Busa, R. SJ et al.
(2000-12) Thomae de Aquino Super Boetium De
Trinitate in Corpus Thomisticum: Index
Thomisticus, Pamplona: Fundación Tomás de
Aquino (Latin text. Web edition): secundum

philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et
intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet
quod voces referuntur ad res significandas,
mediante conceptione intellectus. Secundum igitur
quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a
nobis potest nominari.
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Ratio enim quam significat nomen est
conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen.
13

This account of the two ways in which
Aquinas uses ratio and its significance for Aquinas’
theology of language is made by Klima, G. (2012) in
‘Theory of Language’ in B.Davies and E. Stumps
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195326093.
003.0028
14

Est nihilominus communicable hoc nomen
Deus, non secundum suam totam significationem,
sed secundum aliquid eius, per quondam
similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant
aliquid divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud,
ego dixi, dii estis.
16
Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem
facultatem naturae creaturae, cum nihil aliud sit
quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae
excedit omnem aliam naturam.
Sic enim necesse quod solus Deus deificet,
communicando consortium divinae naturae per
quandam similitudinis participationem.
15

There is an extended treatment of how
Christian theology can use non-Christian thought in
Aquinas’ commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate,
Aquinas Super de Trinitate 1.2.3.
17

9

